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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Issue I: When there was no dispute of the material fact that Ms. Call knew of Dr. 
Keiter's alleged negligence before the statute of limitations ran and Ms. Call's own 
expert was critical of care provided before the statute of limitations ran, did the trial court 
err in partially denying Dr. Keiter's motion for summary judgment and in allowing Ms. 
Call to split her claim to seek damages only for care provided after a cut-off date chosen 
by Ms. Call? 
Standard of Review: On appeal from a summary judgment motion, the appellate court 
reviews the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See 
Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah 1993). Whether a party is entitled 
to summary judgment presents a question of law and the appellate court grants no 
deference to the trial court's legal conclusions and reviews them for correctness. See 
Higgins, 855 P.2d at 235; Stangl v. Ernst Home Ctr., 948 P.2d 356, 360 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997). On appeal, the appellate court needs only to review whether the trial court erred 
in its application of the law and whether a material fact was in dispute. See Holmes Dev., 
LLC v. Cook, 2002 UT 38, f21, 48 P.3d 895. 
Issue Preserved: Record at 261-340; 413-14; 736-743; 933-36; 1815: 36-75; 1816: 3-
5; 1819:328-331. 
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Issue II: Dr. Keiter provided the trial court with a factual predicate that demonstrated 
the breast implant was defective and leaked silicone into Ms. Call's body and Ms. Call's 
own expert proved that the leaked silicone triggered the chain of events that led to Dr. 
Keiter's treatment. Did the trial court err when it precluded Dr. Keiter from listing the 
implant manufacturer on the special verdict form for purposes of apportionment of fault? 
Standard of Review: The trial court's application of the Liability Reform Act in 
apportioning fault is a question of law, reviewed for correctness. Bishop v. GenTec Inc., 
2002 UT 36, ^|8, 48 P.3d 218. Because the issue presented in this case is specific to the 
use of a special verdict to apportion fault in accordance with the LRA, the correctness 
standard should control. There is, however, some uncertainty with regard to the standard 
that applies to the use of special verdicts in general. Compare Clayton v. Ford Motor 
Co., 2009 UT App 154, f7, P.3d (June 11, 2009) ("'The use of special verdicts 
or interrogatories is a matter for the trial court's sound discretion.'" (citation omitted)) 
with Hart v. Salt Lake County, 945 P.2d 125, 136 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) ("A special 
verdict form is a jury instruction, and determining the propriety of jury instructions 
presents a question of law we review for correctness."). 
Issue Preserved: Record at 95-97; 655-57; 944-972; 977-995; 1800: 666-72; 1821: 
825-34, 876-77, 900; 1822: 910-16, 937. 
Issue III: After partially denying Dr. Keiter's motion for summary judgment and 
precluding Dr. Keiter from apportioning fault to the implant manufacturer, did the trial 
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court further err when it denied Dr. Keiter's motion for a directed verdict and his post-
trial motions on these issues? 
Standard of Review: When reviewing a party's motion for a directed verdict, the 
standard is whether reasonable minds could differ on the evidence presented. If 
reasonable minds could not differ on the evidence, the trial court erred in denying Dr. 
Keiter's motion. See Management ofGraystone Pine Homeowner's Ass 'n ex rel Owners 
of Condominiums v. Graystone Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 896 (Utah 1982). In reviewing a 
motion for a new trial, the trial court has broad discretion in ruling on such a motion. See 
Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991). 
Issue Preserved: Record at 1287-89; 1290-1346; 1442-1688; 1820: 479-93. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-
103(2)(j). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, 
RULES, AND REGULATIONS 
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See Addendum 
Utah Code § 78B-3-404 
(1) A malpractice action against a health care provider shall be commenced within two 
years after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence 
should have discovered the injury, whichever first occurs, but not to exceed four years 
after the date of the alleged act, omission, neglect, or occurrence. 
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Utah Code § 78B-5-818 
(3) No defendant is liable to any person seeking recovery for any amount in excess of the 
proportion of fault attributed to that defendant under Section 78B-5-819. 
(4) (a) The fact finder may, and when requested by a party shall, allocate the percentage 
or proportion of fault attributable to each person seeking recovery, to each defendant, to 
any person immune from suit, and to any other person identified under Subsection 78B-5-
821(4) for whom there is a factual and legal basis to allocate fault. . . . 
Utah Code § 78B-5-819 
(1) The trial court may, and when requested by any party shall, direct the jury, if any, to 
find separate special verdicts determining the total amount of damages sustained and the 
percentage or proportion of fault attributable to each person seeking recovery, to each 
defendant, to any person immune from suit, and to any other person identified under 
Subsection 78B-5-821(4) for whom there is a factual and legal basis to allocate fault. 
Utah Code § 78B-5-820 
(1) Subject to Section 78B-5-818, the maximum amount for which a defendant may be 
liable to any person seeking recovery is that percentage or proportion of the damages 
equivalent to the percentage or proportion of fault attributed to that defendant. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Sharlene Call ("Ms. Call") initiated this action against Dr. John Keiter, a plastic 
surgeon, alleging that he had committed malpractice in his medical treatment of her. A 
jury found in favor of Ms. Call, and Dr. Keiter now appeals the verdict. 
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Facts 
In this medical malpractice action, Sharlene Call asserted a claim against Dr. 
Keiter for treatment he provided to her for problems she experienced with her left breast. 
(R. at 001-2.) Ms. Call was born with a chest deformity known as pectus excavatum. (R. 
at 002.) This deformity causes the chest to be concave and often requires reconstructive 
surgery to allow development of the chest and the internal organs. Ms. Call had 
reconstructive surgery when she was a child. 
In 1981, Ms. Call first saw Dr. Keiter. (R. at 262.) Dr. Keiter performed breast 
augmentation, using silicone implants. (R. at 262-63.) Ms. Call had the silicone implants 
for about 13 years without incident. (R. at 263.) In 1995, Ms. Call stated that she 
believed the implant ruptured when she was hugged, and later, she saw Dr. Keiter 
because she felt a lump in her left breast. (R. at 263, 277.) Dr. Keiter removed the lump, 
which turned out to be a silicone granuloma, and also replaced both implants with saline 
implants. (R. at 263, 266.) During this surgery, Dr. Keiter confirmed that the left 
implant was leaking silicone into Ms. Call's breast cavity, and he removed as much of the 
silicone from her breast as he could. (R. at 263, 266, 281.) During the treatment in 1995, 
Dr. Keiter told Ms. Call that silicone had leaked, that it had created the granuloma that he 
removed, and that some of the silicone remained in her breast cavity and could cause 
future problems. (R. at 263-64, 307.) 
Indeed, four years later, Ms. Call developed another lump in her left breast. (R. at 
264.) In July 1999, Ms. Call returned to Dr. Keiter for treatment. In September 1999, 
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Dr. Keiter performed surgery to remove the lump and confirmed that the lump was a 
silicone granuloma. He continued to treat her during this period through January 2000. 
(R. at 264-65, 282.) During this treatment, Dr. Keiter again told Ms. Call that residual 
silicone from the 1995 rupture remained in her body and that she would most likely 
develop additional granulomas. (R. at 264-65, 282-83, 307.) During the surgery to 
remove the granuloma, Dr. Keiter also removed the implant, cleaned it, and reinserted it 
into Ms. Call's chest. During the surgery, Dr. Keiter had to thin some of the skin tissue 
in her left breast. (R. at 307.) 
Later in November 2000, Ms. Call returned to Dr. Keiter for treatment of a wound 
that had developed at the bottom of her left breast near the area where Dr. Keiter had 
previously removed the implant and thinned her skin tissue in 1999. (R. at 265, 284-86.) 
Dr. Keiter continued to treat Ms. Call through October 15, 2001, at which point she 
switched to different physicians for treatment. (R. at 284-292, 316.) 
Procedural Details of Case and Disposition of the Case Below 
Well before trial, Dr. Keiter filed a Notice of Intent to Apportion Fault to Dow 
Corning on the basis that it manufactured the silicone breast implant that ruptured and 
leaked silicone into plaintiffs breast. (R. at 95-96.) Subsequently, Dr. Keiter filed a 
second notice listing additional implant manufacturers because it was unclear who the 
actual manufacturer was. (R. at 655-656.) 
In addition to asking the trial court to apportion fault to the implant manufacturer, 
Dr. Keiter filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Ms. Call failed to initiate 
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this action within the applicable statute of limitations. Dr. Keiter argued that Ms. Call 
knew the requisite facts to trigger the statute of limitations by July 1999, when she 
returned for surgery to remove silicone granulomas. (R. at 262-64.) Dr. Keiter's motion 
was supported by the parties' deposition testimony, Ms. Call's discovery responses, and 
her own expert's criticism of Dr. Keiter's care. (R. at 262-66, 282-83, 307, 336-37, 340.) 
Ms. Call's opposition memorandum failed to contradict any of the material facts 
in Dr. Keiter's motion regarding when she learned of her cause of action. (R. at 574-78.) 
Her opposition memorandum admitted that Dr. Keiter was negligent prior to the date of 
the claims that she intended to assert at trial. (R. at 585.) Indeed, Ms. Call argued this 
evidence was relevant evidence at trial, despite the fact that she was not making a claim 
for this conduct. (R. at 585.) Ms. Call's opposition was largely premised on her 
argument that she was not seeking to recover damages for care provided prior to 2000 
and she sought only to recover damages for care rendered on or after December 18, 2000. 
(R. at 585.) 
The trial court partially granted Dr. Keiter's motion, but it issued a final order 
concluding that Ms. Call's claims after December 18, 2000 were still viable. (R. at 691-
92.) Later, the trial court clarified that the parties could introduce evidence related to Dr. 
Keiter's pre-2000 treatment; however, the trial court told the parties they could refer to 
the pre-2000 treatment only in a "neutral" manner. (R. at 1816: 3-5.) 
Ms. Call filed a trial brief which, among other claims, indicated that Dr. Keiter 
was negligent in his treatment of her beginning with the December 18, 2000 surgery 
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because he failed to remove the contaminated material from her breast pocket during that 
surgery. (R. at 1152.) She later elaborated on this claim and stated that Dr. Keiter failed 
to remove scar tissue and "free silicone" that existed in the pocket. (R. at 1154-55.) This 
criticism was identical to her expert's criticisms of Dr. Keiter's care in the 1995 and 1999 
surgeries. (Compare R. at 1152, 1154-55 with R. at 266, 336-37, 340.) 
At trial, Dr. Keiter moved for a direct verdict. Dr. Keiter referenced the 
summary judgment ruling and the trial court's previous ruling and argued that Ms. Call 
could not recover damages related to additional or future silicone removal and that she 
had already been compensated for a defective implant. (R. at 1820: 480.) The trial court 
largely denied Dr. Keiter's motion. (R. at 1820:489-93.) 
After trial, Dr. Keiter submitted a post-trial motion that renewed his motion for a 
directed verdict. (R. at 1287-1346.) The trial court denied Dr. Keiter's post-trial 
motions. (R. at 1794-97.) Subsequently, Dr. Keiter filed this appeal. (R. at 1804-05.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Ms. Call's testimony established that Dr. Keiter told her that silicone remained 
in her body after her implant ruptured in 1995 and that she would likely experience future 
problems due to the residual silicone. Ms. Call's expert witness, Dr. Robert Miner, 
criticized the care Dr. Keiter provided to Ms. Call in both the 1995 and 1999 surgeries as 
being below the applicable standard of care. At trial, Ms. Call requested damages for 
surgeries to remove silicone granulomas created by the residual silicone. 
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Notwithstanding these undisputed facts, the trial court partially denied Dr. 
Keiter's motion for summary judgment, which argued that Ms. Call possessed the 
requisite factual knowledge to begin the two-year statute of limitations in 1999. This was 
error. 
The trial court accepted Ms. Call's argument that she sought to recover only for 
injuries she sustained after December 18, 2000. Accordingly, the trial court ruled that 
any claims for injuries prior to December 18, 2000 were barred by the statute of 
limitations, but Ms. Call could proceed with her claims after that cut-off date. 
Furthermore, the trial court allowed Ms. Call to introduce evidence of the treatment that 
was provided by Dr. Keiter prior to December 18, 2000. The result was a confusing trial 
in which the jury heard extensive evidence relating to the time-barred treatment coupled 
with Ms. Call's claim for damages incurred after the trial court's limitations cut-off date. 
In addition to this confusing evidence, the jury heard evidence that Ms. Call's 
first breast implants were defective. The jury learned that one of the implants ruptured in 
1995 and leaked silicone into Ms. Call's body. Dr. Keiter and Ms. Call's expert, Dr. 
Miner, told the jury it was impossible to remove all of the silicone after a rupture. The 
defect in the silicone implant and the rupture were not the fault of Dr. Keiter. 
When Dr. Keiter asked to apportion fault and to list the implant manufacturer on 
the special verdict, the trial court denied his request. Because the implant manufacturer's 
defective implant ruptured before the limitations cut-off date and the silicone leaked into 
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Ms. Call before this date, the trial court ruled that Dr. Keiter had not provided a sufficient 
basis to apportion fault to the implant manufacturer. This was error. 
Finally, the trial court was given an opportunity to revisit its earlier rulings on 
both Dr. Keiter's summary judgment motion and his request to apportion fault when Dr. 
Keiter moved for a directed verdict after the close of Ms. Call's case-in-chief and in his 
post-trial motions. The trial court sealed Dr. Keiter's fate when it denied these motions. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The trial court erred in partially denying Dr. Keiter's motion for 
summary judgment. 
The trial court should have granted Dr. Keiter's motion for summary judgment in 
full, because the statute of limitations accrued in 1999 at the latest. Ms. Call's own 
expert stated that the real trigger for her claims was the 1995 and 1999 surgeries, during 
which Dr. Keiter failed to remove all of the silicone and set in motion the silicone 
granulomas and need for later surgeries. When Dr. Keiter moved for summary judgment, 
Ms. Call argued that she was alleging negligence relating only to the December 18, 2000 
surgery and subsequent treatment in an effort to avoid the clear statute of limitations 
problems that she faced. 
Plaintiffs are not allowed to split their causes of action to fit within applicable 
statutes of limitation, and they are not allowed to pick arbitrary cut-off dates but still 
introduce evidence of and rely on evidence of antecedent treatments to bolster their 
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claims. This is precisely what Ms. Call did, and it was the trial court's failure to grant Dr. 
Keiter's summary judgment motion that allowed Ms. Call to change and mold her claims 
to avoid the statute of limitations, thereby creating jury confusion and prejudice to Dr. 
Keiter. 
A. The undisputed facts establish that Ms. Call had the requisite knowledge 
to trigger the statute of limitations in 1999. 
Although Ms. Call claims she is attempting to recover only for negligent 
treatment of her infection from December 18, 2000 forward, her own testimony 
established that she knew of her injuries in 1999, and her expert established that the 
injuries were related to the earlier treatment. Because Ms. Call knew of her injury in 
1995 and again in 1999, she had, at the latest, two years in which to commence this 
action. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-404 ("A malpractice action against a health care 
provider shall be commenced within two years from 1999 after the plaintiff or patient 
discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered the injury, 
whichever first occurs, but not to exceed four years after the date of the alleged act, 
omission, neglect, or occurrence."). 
Ms. Call, however, failed to file her notice of intent within the two-year statute 
of limitations for a medical malpractice claim. The term "injury" as used in the statute 
means "legal injury", which has been interpreted to require that a plaintiff "knew or 
should have known that he had sustained an injury and that the injury was caused by 
negligent action." See Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144, 148 (Utah 1979). Dr. Keiter 
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moved for summary judgment, setting forth undisputed facts to establish that Ms. Call 
had the requisite knowledge under the Foil test to trigger the statute of limitations as 
early as 1999. Specifically, Dr. Keiter's motion established the following sequence of 
events before 2000: 
Ms. Call first presented to Dr. Keiter on or about June 12, 1981 for breast 
augmentation, and she saw Dr. Keiter for corresponding post-operative care 
through April 6, 1982. After April 6, 1982, Ms. Call did not see Dr. Keiter for 
over thirteen years. 
Ms. Call next saw Dr. Keiter on May 25, 1995, complaining of a lump in the area 
of her left breast. Radiology studies were performed which indicated that the left 
implant was ruptured. 
Dr. Keiter performed surgery on May 25, 1995 and removed the left breast mass, 
removed the right and left silicone implants, and inserted bilateral saline implants. 
At the time of her May 25, 1995 surgery, Dr. Keiter informed Ms. Call that he 
could not remove all of the silicone and that she may experience problems in the 
future as a result. 
Ms. Call next saw Dr. Keiter on July 30, 1999, complaining of lumps in the area of 
her left breast. 
At this time, Ms. Call was aware that she was experiencing problems associated 
with retained silicone, which a biopsy later confirmed. This problem necessitated 
a surgery on September 13, 1999 to remove a silicone granuloma. 
(R. at 262-64.) Although Ms. Call saw Dr. Keiter for additional treatments after these 
events, these events and Ms. Call's knowledge of them were sufficient to trigger the 
statute of limitations. Specifically, Ms. Call's notice of intent, which was not filed until 
October 18, 2002, was filed more than a year too late as the statute of limitations would 
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have commenced in July 1999, when Ms. Call saw Dr. Keiter for lumps in her breast that 
were caused by retained silicone. 
In opposing Dr. Keiter's motion, Ms. Call argued: "Contrary to defendant's 
Motion, and despite the defendant's attempt to misconstrue the bases of Ms. Call's claims 
against him, Ms. Call's claims are not based upon any of the defendant's actions which 
occurred prior to October 18, 2000. Instead, the bases of all of Ms. Call's claims against 
the defendant stem entirely from the surgeries that the defendant performed for Ms. Call 
on December 18, 2000; August 27, 2001; October 15, 2001; and the care (not) provided 
after those surgeries." (R. at 584.) In an effort to get the best of both worlds, Ms. Call 
also argued that "evidence of the defendant's negligence prior to October 18, 2000, is 
still relevant to the claims at issue." (R. at 585 (emphasis added).) 
In order to understand how Dr. Keiter arrived at the position where he would 
seemingly misunderstand the nature of Ms. Call's claims, Ms. Call's verified complaint 
and discovery responses must be examined. Ms. Call's verified complaint contained two 
paragraphs of facts to provide notice to Dr. Keiter as to the nature of her claims. In her 
verified complaint, Ms. Call made the following factual allegations: 
8. Sharlene Call suffers from a condition known as pectus excavatum deformity 
that has required numerous reconstructive surgeries. Dr. Keiter has performed and 
provided medical services for Sharlene Call. 
9. Sharlene Call, among other problems, has developed abscesses and ulcers. Dr. 
Keiter has treated for the abscesses, ulcers, by removing the breast implants and 
implanting new breast implants. 
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(R. at 002.) Ms. Call's verified complaint contains no other factual background to 
provide Dr. Keiter notice of the nature of her claims. No dates or specific treatments are 
referenced; however, one specific event that is reference is the new breast implant. Dr. 
Keiter replaced the implants during the 1995 surgery, lending some credence to his belief 
that she was claiming negligence related to treatment provided prior to 2000. 
Accordingly, Dr. Keiter served written discovery requests to have Ms. Call 
identify the bases for her claims. Dr. Keiter's interrogatory number 7 asked: "Describe 
in detail the acts, omissions and conduct of Defendant upon which you base your 
allegation that Defendant was negligent in rendering or failure to render medical care." 
(R. at 265, 331.) In response, Ms. Call answered: "Dr. Keiter breached the standard of 
care by not properly diagnosing and/or treating the severe infection Ms. Call developed 
from her breast surgery. Also see Dr. Miner's report." (R. at 265-66, 331 (emphasis 
added).) Significantly, Dr. Miner's report indicated that Dr. Keiter was negligent in both 
the May 25, 1995 surgery and the September 13, 1999 surgery in failing to remove all of 
the free silicone that existed in Ms. Call's breast after her implant ruptured. (R. at 266, 
337.) Moreover, Dr. Miner later testified in his deposition that the 1995 surgery fell 
below the standard of care "and really set up everything else for a downfall, because in 
not getting rid of that silicone, that led to the silicone granuloma." (R. at 266, 340.) 
According to Ms. Call's own expert witness, then, the critical, triggering 
negligent treatments were the 1995 and 1999 surgeries in which Dr. Keiter failed to 
remove silicone and failed to properly clean out the capsule in Ms. Call's breast. 
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Nonetheless, to avoid summary judgment, Ms. Call shifted position and claimed that the 
resulting infection in 2000 was the starting point for her claims and the statute of 
limitations, and it was Dr. Keiter's inability to treat the infection from that point on that 
was negligent. 
In partially denying Dr. Keiter's motion for summary judgment on the statute of 
limitations, the trial court concluded that any claims arising prior to December 18, 2000 
were time-barred and determined that Ms. Call's claims related only to treatment after 
December 18, 2000. (R. at 691-92.) Accordingly, the trial court ruled that no material 
facts existed as to Ms. Call's knowledge of the alleged negligence prior to 2000. Despite 
that ruling, the trial court determined that Ms. Call could pursue her claim for negligence 
as it related to any injuries after 2000. 
In reviewing the trial court's ruling on Dr. Keiter's summary judgment motion, 
this Court does not need to accept the trial court's conclusions. See, e.g., Snow v. Rudd, 
2000 UT 20, f 13, 998 P.2d 262 (reversing trial court's denial of summary judgment on 
statute of limitations). On appeal, the appellate court needs only to review whether the 
trial court erred in its application of the law and whether a material fact was in dispute. 
See Holmes Dev., LLC v. Cook, 2002 UT 38, f21, 48 P.3d 895. The reviewing court 
must view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party; however, when 
the facts are not in dispute and are susceptible to a determination as a matter of law, the 
reviewing court may reverse a trial court's improper denial of summary judgment. See 
id. at THJ13-15. In Snow, the Utah Supreme Court concluded the trial court had erred in 
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denying defendant's summary judgment motion, stating: "This is a clear case of a 
plaintiff simply sitting on her rights." Id. at ^13. 
Similarly, Ms. Call in this case sat on her rights and failed to timely file her 
complaint. The undisputed facts demonstrate that Ms. Call knew in 1995 that it was 
impossible to remove all of the silicone in her breast, and that she would likely develop 
granulomas in the future. As anticipated, Ms. Call had follow-up surgery in September 
1999 to remove a silicone granuloma that developed because of the residual silicone in 
her breast. Ms. Call was aware of what necessitated this 1999 surgery. Ms. Call's own 
expert was critical of the treatment Dr. Keiter provided in both the 1995 and 1999 
surgeries. Because the facts related to these surgeries were not disputed and because 
these facts were sufficient to trigger the running of the two-year statute of limitations, 
Ms. Call needed to file her notice of claim within two years from the September 1999 
surgery at the latest. The trial court implicitly recognized that Ms. Call's suit was 
untimely when it granted Dr. Keiter's motion as to any claim prior to December 18, 2000. 
The trial court erred in granting only partial summary judgment. In addition to 
being critical of Dr. Keiter's care in both the 1995 and 1999 surgeries, Ms. Call's expert 
also discussed that these two surgeries "really set up everything else for a downfall." (R 
at 266, 340.) When taken together, the trial court's ruling and Ms. Call's own expert's 
opinion establish all the facts necessary to grant Dr. Keiter's motion for summary 
judgment in its entirety. The trial court ruled Ms. Call had the requisite knowledge prior 
to December 18, 2000, and Ms. Call's expert established that the post-2000 injury was a 
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result of the pre-2000 treatment. Thus, the trial court should have granted Dr. Keiter's 
motion in full because Ms. Call's action was untimely. 
B. Ms. Call cannot avoid the statute of limitations by limiting her claims to 
only the post-2000 treatment. 
In opposition to Dr. Keiter's motion for summary judgment, Ms. Call argued 
that Dr. Keiter was improperly characterizing her claims and that her claims were limited 
to his treatment from December 18, 2000 onward. Ms. Call did not substantively oppose 
Dr. Keiter's motion, but instead argued that he simply misunderstood her claims. This 
attempt to mold her claims to meet the statute of limitations flies in the face of well-
established Utah law. 
1. Ms. Call limited her claims only after Dr. Keiter filed his motion. 
In opposing Dr. Keiter's motion, Ms. Call purported to clarify that her claims 
were only for treatment after December 18, 2000. But under Utah law, a plaintiff cannot 
change her theory of the case or offer new theories in order to oppose a motion for 
summary judgment. The Utah Supreme Court has held that a "plaintiff cannot amend the 
complaint by raising novel claims or theories for recovery in a memorandum in 
opposition to a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment because such amendment 
fails to satisfy Utah's pleading requirements." Holmes Dev., LLC v. Cook, 2002 UT 38, 
f31, 48 P.3d 895; see also Harper v. Evans, 2008 UT App 165, fl4, 185 P.3d 573. 
Undoubtedly, Ms. Call will argue that she was not changing her claim in opposing Dr. 
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Keiter's motion for summary judgment, but rather, her claim has always been solely for 
the post-2000 injury. The record, however, shows otherwise. 
Ms. Call's complaint alleges only that Dr. Keiter treated Ms. Call and that Ms. 
Call has suffered some general injuries; it was vague and ambiguous as to the specifics of 
her claim, even under a liberal notice-pleading standard, and did not give Dr. Keiter 
notice of the nature, basis, or grounds for her claim. See MBNA America Bank, N.A. v. 
Goodman, 2006 UT App 276, f6, 140 P.3d 589 (stating plaintiff umust only give the 
defendant fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds of the claim and a general 
indication of the type of litigation involved."). Indeed, Dr. Keiter may have been able to 
move for a more definite statement. See Canfieldv. Layton City, 2005 UT 60, ^fl4, 122 
P.3d 622. Because such motions are disfavored, see id., Dr. Keiter served discovery 
requests on Ms. Call to determine the specifics of her claim. 
In her response, Ms. Call again identified her general injuries in her verified 
complaint and incorporated by reference her expert witness's opinion. Ms. Call's expert 
witness identified both these general injuries and also identified the 1995 and 1999 
surgeries as being below the standard of care and setting everything in motion for the 
2000 infection. Thus, prior to filing his summary judgment motion, Dr. Keiter was on 
notice that Ms. Call was seeking to recover for care provided after December 2000 and 
also the allegedly sub-standard surgeries that predated the December 2000 surgery. 
Moreover, in her opposition memorandum, Ms. Call stated: 
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Although the bases of Sharlene Call's claims against the 
defendant in this lawsuit stem entirely from the surgeries that 
the defendant performed for Sharlene Call on December 18, 
2000; August 27, 2001; October 15, 2001; and the care 
provided after those surgeries, evidence of the defendant's 
negligence prior to October 18, 2000, is still relevant to the 
claims at issue. 
(R. at 585.) In other words, Ms. Call acknowledged her belief that Dr. Keiter was 
negligent prior to December 18, 2000 and that his early negligence was relevant and 
admissible at trial; however, Ms. Call also said that she was not asserting a claim for the 
earlier negligence. 
Ms. Call's tactic is not allowed under Utah law. Ms. Call amended and limited 
her claims to the post-December 18, 2000 treatment only to avoid the statute of 
limitations. She did so for the first time in opposition to Dr. Keiter's motion for summary 
judgment. She acknowledged that she believed Dr. Keiter's early care was also 
negligent, but she contended that she wanted to use that evidence at trial only to support 
her claims that were not barred by the statute of limitations. A plaintiff cannot have it 
both ways to avoid the statute of limitations. 
2. Ms. Call cannot isolate certain treatment from other related treatment 
in order to avoid triggering a limitations period. 
Although a plaintiff is entitled to be master of her claim, she cannot cherry-pick 
certain events in a series of related treatments in order to preclude a statute of limitations 
defense. This issue invokes certain policy considerations that the Utah Legislature 
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contemplated in creating the language of the statute governing when the limitations 
period begins. 
The Utah Legislature has expressed its desire to require potential medical 
malpractice claimants to actively pursue their claims. In contrast to other general statutes 
of limitations that are not triggered until a plaintiff learns of the full extent of injury and 
has knowledge of each element of a claim, the medical malpractice statute of limitations 
begins to run when a person has some injury and knowledge that the injury may be linked 
to negligence. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-404; Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144, 148 
(Utah 1979). Interpreting this standard, this Court has differentiated between knowledge 
of a legal cause of action and knowledge sufficient to trigger the medical malpractice 
statute of limitations. See Deschamps v. Pulley, 784 P.2d 471, 475 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 
(holding a legal determination of negligence is not necessary, but rather only facts that 
would lead a reasonable person to conclude that she may have claim). The medical 
malpractice statute of limitations is triggered when a reasonable person is put on inquiry 
notice that a claim may exist—regardless of whether a lawyer or expert witness has 
confirmed the validity of the legal claim. 
If plaintiffs can pick and choose from events in a related series of treatment, 
statutes of limitations would have no meaning, because plaintiffs could simply exclude 
earlier treatment and assert claims based only on the more recent events within the 
limitations period. For example, in Harper v. Evans, the plaintiff filed a complaint 
identifying two surgeries as being negligent. After the defendant filed a motion for 
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summary judgment, the plaintiff argued the surgeries were not negligent, but rather the 
physician's post-operative care was negligent and the cause of the plaintiffs injuries. In 
addition, the plaintiff belatedly argued the continuous negligent treatment rule. See 
Harper v. Evans, 2008 UT App 165, ^ [6, 185 P.3d 573. This court rejected each of the 
plaintiffs attempts to avoid the statute of limitations. See id. 
In Harper, the plaintiff attempted to do an end run around the statute of 
limitations period by reclassifying her claims. In this case, the considerations are no 
different. Ms. Call knew that claims based on the earlier procedures were hopelessly 
time-barred, and accordingly, she changed her position and identified the December 2000 
treatment as the basis for her claims because then her notice of intent would have been 
timely. 
In some instances, a patient may legitimately be able to isolate treatment from a 
single health care provider; however, this is not that case. First, the treatment from 1995 
on was inextricably linked to the later care and treatment. Moreover, the record shows 
that Ms. Call had the requisite knowledge under the statute to trigger the limitations 
period in 1995 or, by the latest, in 1999; and the record also shows that Ms. Call's own 
expert was critical of earlier treatment and believed that it set the wheels in motion to 
cause Ms. Call's injury. In light of the established and uncontested facts in the record, 
Ms. Call cannot argue that the earlier treatment was non-negligent while the treatment in 
the limitations period was negligent. 
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In Steele v. Organon, Inc., the plaintiff was incorrectly warned about taking 
ergotamine, a vascular constrictor, for her migraine headaches. See id., 716 P.2d 920 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1986). In Steele, the plaintiff overdosed on the drug and was 
hospitalized with ergot poisoning in 1973. In 1974, the plaintiff consulted with an 
attorney about whether she had a claim, but her doctors did not believe there was a link 
between her injury and the overdose. Seven years later, the plaintiff suffered a heart 
attack and stroke, and a doctor advised her that these injuries were related to the 1973 
overdose. 
As Ms. Call did in this case, the plaintiff in Steele argued she was not damaged 
by the overdose until her later heart attack and stroke. The Washington Court of Appeals 
disagreed, stating: "Where an injury, although slight, is sustained in consequence of the 
wrongful act of another, and the law affords a remedy therefore, the statute of limitations 
attaches at once.55 Id. at 234. The Steele court went on to state that "[i]t is not material 
that all the damages resulting from the act shall have been sustained at that time, and the 
running of the statute is not postponed by the fact that the actual or substantial damages 
do not occur until a later date.55 Id. The court, citing policy considerations for statutes of 
limitations, went on to reject the plaintiffs arguments that the ergot poisoning and the 
heart attack were separate and distinct injuries with different statutes of limitations. See 
id. at 235; see also Withers v. Sterling Drugs, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 878, 881 (S.D. Ind. 
1970) (holding plaintiff could not split cause of action into one for temporary injury and 
one for permanent injury). 
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The common theme of these other opinions is that a plaintiff cannot split a cause 
of action in an effort to avoid the statute of limitations, which begins to run once some 
harm manifests itself A plaintiff is not required to appreciate or know the full extent of 
the harm in order to trigger the statute of limitations. These same considerations are 
present in Utah cases addressing the statute of limitations under the Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act. 
Recently, the Utah Supreme Court has clarified the application of Utah's one 
action rule in the context of medical malpractice claims. In Medved v. Glenn, the Utah 
Supreme Court held that Utah's one action rule required a plaintiff to assert a claim once 
some harm has manifested itself, even if plaintiff anticipated some future harm might 
arise. See id., 2005 UT 77, [^14, 125 P.3d 913. Further, the Supreme Court noted that 
failing to assert a claim once some injury was present "may very well preclude any 
subsequent attempts at recovery." Id. In Medved, the Supreme Court relied on and 
clarified its earlier ruling in Seale v. Gowans, in which it held that the possibility of future 
harm without any present injury did not constitute a legally cognizable injury and did not 
trigger the statute of limitations. See Seale v. Gowans, 923 P.2d 1361, 1364-65 (Utah 
1996). In Medved, the Court held a present injury along with the possibility of future 
harm did trigger the statute of limitations. See Medved, 2005 UT 77 at ^14. 
Both Seale and Medved involved a physician's failure to timely diagnose cancer. 
In Seale, because of the misdiagnosis, the plaintiff faced an increased risk of the cancer's 
recurrence. When the cancer returned three years later, the plaintiff filed a lawsuit. The 
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Supreme Court held the lawsuit was timely because the increased possible chance of 
cancer was not a legally cognizable injury until the cancer actually returned and plaintiff 
had suffered damages. See Seale, 923 P.2d at 1364-65. In Medved, the physician also 
failed to timely diagnose cancer. When the cancer was later discovered, the plaintiff 
underwent a radical and invasive surgery to remove the cancer and also faced an 
increased risk of the cancer's recurrence. The plaintiff filed a claim based on the more 
invasive surgery and also for her increased risk of the cancer's recurrence. The Supreme 
Court distinguished Medved from Seale because the plaintiff had also claimed present 
injury from the invasive surgery to remove the cancer. See Medved, 2005 UT 77 at ^ |14. 
Recognizing the one action rule and the rule against splitting causes of action, 
the Supreme Court in both Seale and Medved reaffirmed that "once some harm is 
manifest, the limitations period begins to run on all claims, present and future." Seale, 
923 P.2d at 1364; see also Medved, 2005 UT 77 at f 14. Specifically, the Supreme Court 
cited to other opinions that expressly disapproved of splitting causes of action or 
separating present injuries from later-developing injuries. See Seale, 923 P.2d at 1364. 
Under the court's analysis, it is debatable whether the court would adopt the chain of 
causality rule discussed above. But even if it did, Ms. Call's injuries are all related and 
would not create separate chains of causation. 
Finally, any claim that the early injuries were temporary or that the infection was 
new, more severe, or more serious have been rejected under Utah law. See Duerden v. 
Utah Valley Hospital, 663 F. Supp. 781, 784-86 (D. Utah 1987), relying on Hove v. 
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McMaster, 621 P.2d 694 (Utah 1980); Reiser v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93 (Utah 1982). 
Consistent with Seale and Medved, this early trilogy of cases in Utah held that the statute 
of limitations begins to run when any injury manifests itself and rejected the plaintiffs' 
arguments that a belief that the injury was only minor or temporary in nature did not 
trigger the limitations period. 
Recently, a federal district court reaffirmed that any injury is sufficient to trigger 
the statute of limitations—regardless of a plaintiff s subjective belief as to the nature or 
duration of the injury. See Cannon v. Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co., 2009 WL 350561 
(D. Utah 2009) (relying on Seale, Duerden, and Reiser, the district court held that 
products liability statute began to run when plaintiff experienced minor reaction to 
medication which he thought was a temporary allergic reaction). Under Utah law, 
plaintiff cannot split her December 2000 injuries from the earlier treatment in order to 
avoid the statute of limitations. Because the uncontested facts show that Ms. Call knew 
of her injury by 1999 and the injury was related to the other earlier injuries, the trial court 
erred in only partially granting Dr. Keiter's motion for summary judgment. 
3. Ms. Call's complaint does not allege continuous negligent treatment. 
Ms. Call's complaint does not discuss any of the treatment provided or give 
sufficient detail to put Dr. Keiter on notice that she intended to invoke the continuous 
negligent treatment rule. Under Utah law, a plaintiffs complaint must contain sufficient 
allegations to put a defendant on notice that the plaintiff intends to invoke the continuous 
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negligent treatment rule as the basis for a claim. See Harper v. Evans, 2008 UT App 165, 
119-14, 185P.3d573. 
As discussed, Ms. Call's complaint contains only the barest of allegations 
regarding Dr. Keiter's treatment and alleged negligence. Ms. Call did not raise the 
continuous negligent treatment rule until after Dr. Keiter moved for summary judgment. 
(R. at 587-88.) Indeed, Ms. Call raised this theory as alternative theory only in the event 
that the trial court determined the earlier treatment should be considered in determining 
when the statute of limitations began to run. In Harper, this Court stated: "In so holding, 
we emphasize that we cannot rely on the allegations of a negligent course of treatment 
raised for the first time in the Harpers' opposition to summary judgment." Id. at 114. 
Similarly, Ms. Call cannot rely on the continuous negligent treatment rule in order to 
avoid the statute of limitations. 
Finally, even if the continuous negligent treatment rule had been timely raised, it 
would not apply to this case. In Collins v. Wilson, the Utah Supreme Court noted: "If the 
patient learns of negligence during the time of treatment... . the discovery rule applies 
and the statute of limitations begins to run accordingly." Id., 1999 UT 56, 110, 984 P.2d 
960. In this case, Ms. Call learned in 1995 and was reminded in 1999 that Dr. Keiter had 
not removed all of the silicone and that it could cause problems later. In fact, the 1999 
surgery was required because all of the silicone had not been removed in 1995. Because 
the undisputed facts show that Ms. Call knew of these facts, the statute of limitations 
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would have begun in 1999 at the latest and the continuous negligent treatment rule would 
not apply. 
C. The trial court's ruling created confusion at trial, and the trial court erred 
in creating an arbitrary cut-off date that governed the evidence at trial. 
In partially denying Dr. Keiter's motion for summary judgment and allowing 
Ms. Call to recover for treatment after December 18, 2000, the trial court's ruling 
permeated the remainder of the proceedings, creating confusion and additional errors. 
The trial court ruled that Ms. Call could claim negligence for treatment rendered after 
December 18, 2000, and also ruled that her claims prior to that date were barred by the 
statute of limitations. (R. at 691-92.) Later at the pre-trial conference, the trial court's 
ruling was clarified to allow the introduction of evidence relating to the treatment prior to 
the cut-off date as long as the evidence was presented in a "neutral" manner. (R. at 1816: 
3-5.) Accordingly, the parties were able to discuss Ms. Call's entire treatment history 
with Dr. Keiter; however, Ms. Call could not introduce evidence or testimony to suggest 
that the treatment prior to December 18, 2000 was negligent. 
At trial, Ms. Call's theory of the case, as presented by her expert witness, Dr. 
Miner, was that Dr. Keiter was negligent in treating the infection for which she sought 
treatment after December 18, 2000. But her expert, Dr. Miner, opined that the infection 
had been present in Ms. Call's body since the earlier treatments (in 1995 and 1999). 
Moreover, Dr. Miner criticized Dr. Keiter's earlier treatment of Ms. Call on multiple 
occasions, contending that Dr. Keiter never properly removed or treated the infection. 
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Although Dr. Miner was careful not to say expressly that the pre-2000 care was 
negligent, he offered veiled criticisms and references to the pre-2000 treatment. 
Dr. Miner presented the jury with a "nidus" of infection theory. (R. at 1819: 
320.) According to Dr. Miner, a nidus is a nest and a source for contamination. Dr. 
Miner testified that the breast formed a capsule around the implant that became the nidus 
for the infection because of the silicone that leaked from the implant. Later, the infection 
manifested itself on the surface in the hole where Dr. Keiter had removed the implants 
and where Dr. Keiter had testified to thinning the skin during the 1999 surgery. (R. at 
1819:323-27,330.) 
In expanding on his nidus of infection theory, Dr. Miner repeatedly testified that 
the infection was created from the early 1995 and 1999 surgeries. (R. at 1819: 339-42.) 
Specifically, Dr. Miner described Ms. Call's infection as being "chronic" and 
"smoldering." Dr. Miner analogized the situation to having a pocket full of honey. He 
said that if you remove an object from the pocket of honey, wash the honey off, and put it 
back into the pocket, then the object will still have honey on it. (R. at 1819: 342.) Dr. 
Miner said that Ms. Call's breast had a chronic—and therefore preexisting—infection 
that Dr. Keiter never properly treated, but rather, Dr. Keiter would simply take the 
implant out, wash it off, and put it back into the infected capsule. (R. at 1819: 342-43.) 
In describing this course of treatment, Dr. Miner was criticizing Dr. Keiter's 
treatment of Ms. Call both before the cut-off date and after the cut-off date. In fact, Dr. 
Miner's criticism of Dr. Keiter's treatment was premised on the fact that he kept treating 
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Ms. Call in the same manner without curing what Dr. Miner believed was the root of the 
problem. (R. at 1819: 343.) Specifically, Dr. Miner testified that Dr. Keiter's treatment 
on December 18, 2000 fell below the standard of care because "once he sees this is a 
recurring problem - and remember this is the third time he's taking out the granuloma in 
the same place - a bell has to go off and say, hey, something else is going on." (R. at 
1819: 344-45 (emphasis added).) Furthermore, when asked if the treatment on December 
18, 2000 was appropriate, Dr. Miner testified: 
[I]t's like the analogy with the honey. You're going to get 
honey back on it. And that's exactly what it did. The honey 
was still there; the bacteria was still there. He hadn't done 
anything to that point or after that point that truly rendered 
the pocket as sterile as he could get it. And as long as you 
keep doing that, like I said, you keep taking the same road, 
you keep getting the same result. 
(R. at 1819: 346 (emphasis added).) 
Even though the jury heard Dr. Miner's testimony criticizing Dr. Keiter's 
treatment of Ms. Call both prior to December 18, 2000 and after that date, the jury was 
instructed that Ms. Call's claims were only for negligence that occurred after December 
18, 2000. This is a classic example of a bell that cannot be un-rung. 
Moreover, if Dr. Miner's nidus of infection theory was accurate, it only lends 
further support to Dr. Keiter's motion for summary judgment. Dr. Miner testified the 
1995 and 1999 surgeries set the wheels in motion for the later problem—the infection. 
At trial, Dr. Miner testified the infection was a chronic problem and a smoldering 
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infection. As such, Ms. Call knew of the chronic problem as early as 1995 and not later 
than 1999 when she required a follow up surgery to remove a granuloma. Given the trial 
court's difficulty in addressing the issue, it is not surprising the jury was also confused by 
the evidence presented at trial. The trial court should have granted Dr. Keiter's summary 
judgment motion in full. 
II. The trial court should have allowed the jury to apportion fault to the breast 
implant manufacturer 
As was well-established at trial, Ms. Call's silicone breast implants were defective, 
an implant ruptured and leaked silicone into her breast, and the leaked silicone created 
Ms. Call's silicone granulomas.1 Simply put, the implant's rupture started the chain of 
causation that led to Ms. Call's developing silicone granulomas and needing surgical and 
other treatment. 
The primary policy behind Utah's comparative fault statutory scheme2 is the 
principle that no defendant should be held liable for more than his or her share of fault. 
1
 See, e.g., R. 1819: 280, 316-17, 323-24, 385; 1820: 458-59, 461-66, 526, 539, 614-15; 
1821: 715, 731, 735-36, 740, 767, 816-17. 
2
 The comparative fault statutory scheme is sometimes referred to as the Liability Reform 
Act. In 1986, the Legislature abolished joint and several liability in favor of a 
comparative fault approach. Yirak v. Dan *s Super Markets, Inc., 2008 UT App 210, [^4, 
188 P.3d 487. Prior to 2008, those statutes were codified at sections 78-27-37 through 
78-27-43 of the Utah Code. After renumbering in 2008, the statutes governing 
comparative fault are now contained in sections 78B-5-817 through 78B-5-823. 
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See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-818(3) (stating "[n]o defendant is liable to any person 
seeking recovery for any amount in excess of the proportion of fault attributed to that 
defendant"); id. § 78B-5-820; Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co., 853 P.2d 877, 880 (Utah 
1993), superseded by statute on other grounds (quoting senate floor debate and noting 
statement that "it is the basic fairness concept we're driving at. The defendant ought to 
be on the hook only for its own percentage of damages, but ought not be the guarantor for 
everyone else's damages."). 
In this case, the jury could have apportioned fault to three people or entities: the 
implant manufacturer, Dr. Keiter, and Ms. Call. But because the jury was allowed to 
apportion fault only between Dr. Keiter and Ms. Call, Dr. Keiter was forced to shoulder 
responsibility for the manufacturer's negligence. This is in direct contravention to the 
express provisions of and the policy considerations underlying the comparative fault 
statute. 
A. Dr. Keiter has a statutory right to have the jury apportion fault to the 
implant manufacturer. 
The trial court erred when it denied Dr. Keiter's multiple requests to apportion 
fault to the implant manufacturers. Under section 78B-5-819(3), the 
fact finder may, and when requested by a party shall, allocate 
the percentage or proportion of fault attributable to each 
person seeking recovery, to each defendant... [and] to any 
person immune from suit , . . . for whom there is a factual and 
legal basis to allocate fault. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-818(4)(a) (emphasis added); see also id. § 78B-5-819(l) 
(stating "trial court may, and when requested by any party shall, direct the jury . . . to find 
separate special verdicts" regarding causation and damages (emphasis added)). All of the 
conditions for mandatory apportionment were met by Dr. Keiter. 
Dr. Keiter made two written requests to allocate fault, and throughout the trial 
itself repeatedly asked the court to instruct and allow the jury to apportion fault to the 
manufacturer of the implant that ruptured and leaked silicone into Ms. Call's body. 
Ample evidence was presented at trial that the silicone implant had ruptured, that it was 
defective, and that it was the direct and proximate cause of the silicone granulomas for 
which Ms. Call sought treatment from Dr. Keiter. See n.l. Dr. Keiter established a 
factual and legal basis to support his request for apportioning fault to the implant 
manufacturer. 
Accordingly, under section 78B-5-818 the trial court was required to instruct the 
jury that it could apportion fault to the manufacturer and was required to include the 
manufacturer on the special verdict form. See also Paulos v. Covenant Trans., Inc., 2004 
UT App 35, %l 1, 86 P.3d 752 ('"All parties are entitled to have their theories of the case 
submitted to the jury in the court's instructions, provided there is competent evidence to 
support them.'" (citation omitted)). 
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B. Allowing apportionment minimizes the potential for confusion, 
promotes the interests of justice, and ensures that no party is held 
liable for another person's negligence. 
Aside from being mandated by section 78B-5-818 in these circumstances, 
allowing the jury to apportion fault to the implant manufacturer furthers the important 
policy interests embodied in Utah's comparative fault statutory scheme. First, 
apportionment serves the primary goal of ensuring that no defendant is held liable for 
another person's fault. "'[T]rue apportionment cannot be achieved unless that 
apportionment includes all tortfeasors guilty of causal negligence either causing or 
contributing to the occurrence in question, whether or not they are parties to the case."5 
Sullivan., 853 P.2d at 882 (quoting Carroll R. Heft & C. James Heft, Comparative 
Negligence Manual, § 8.100, at 14 (John J. Palmer & Stephen M. Flanagan eds., rev. ed. 
1992)). 
In addition, special verdicts are "useful tools that assist jurors in making step-by-
step findings in complex cases[.]" Dixon v. Stewart, 658 P.2d 591, 594 (Utah 1982). 
This case presented a complex set of facts for which a special verdict would have greatly 
aided the jury. The trial court and the parties repeatedly acknowledged the difficulties 
created by the fact that Ms. Call's cause of action ran only from December 18, 2000 
forward, but the implant had ruptured years previously—and that without the rupture, 
there would have been no granulomas. During one colloquy, the trial court noted that if 
the jury was not allowed to apportion fault as contemplated in the statute, "I think the 
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jury is going to be confused. They are going to think they have to apportion fault to the 
defendant or the plaintiff and when it comes down to injuries caused by silicone or the 
silicone implant that she had in 1981 and that continues apparently to cause her problems, 
they won't know what to do with that information." (R. at 1821: 832.) The trial court 
had noted that it was "unfair" that "no one got to go in and make a comparison between 
any, if there was any negligence between Dr. Keiter and the breast implant producer[.]" 
(R. at 1821: 676.) 
The jury was instructed not to consider events predating the December 18, 2000 
surgery, but that instruction did not cure the potential for confusion (nor did it ameliorate 
the harm to Dr. Keiter). Ms. Call argued that Dr. Keiter should have removed more 
silicone than he did in the 2000 surgery. But because there was no dispute that the 
-5 
There was considerable back-and-forth on the issue of whether apportionment should be 
allowed, and at several points the trial court and the parties contemplated that 
apportionment would be required if Ms. Call was claiming damages for future surgeries 
(because those would stem from the granulomas that were caused by the ruptured silicone 
implants). (See, e.g., R. at 1821: 837 (court stated "I think we can craft [a] . . . special 
verdict form that says . . . [i]f you decide to award damages for future situations then you 
must compare how much of that is Dr. Keiter and how much of that is related to Dr. 
Keiter's treatment if so, and how much is located to the product—"); 840-41 (court stated 
"[how much is the fact that that stuff [silicone] is there is because every doctor, even your 
doctor testified that you can't remove it entirely and so the question becomes then do you 
have to make it comparative on that damage? If she needs future surgeries to remove 
these, how much of that is attributable to Dr. Keiter's care and how much of that is 
attributed to the fact that the silicone was there in the first place?").) Indeed there was 
significant shifting of positions on what, exactly, Ms. Call was claiming. Ultimately, in 
closing argument Ms. Call did ask for damages for future surgeries to "cleanup" the 
former implant's pocket and insert new implants (R. at 984-85), and the jury was asked to 
enter an amount for future medical expenses on the verdict form. 
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granulomas were there solely because of the leaked silicone and there was no dispute that 
it was impossible for any doctor to remove all of the silicone, the jury must have 
wondered—just as the trial court queried—"how much of that is attributable to Dr. 
Keiter's care and how much of that is attributed to the fact that the silicone was there in 
the first place?" (R. at 1821: 840.) The mere fact that the trial court struggled so 
mightily with delineating the temporal and causal limitations of Ms. Call's claims, and 
whether those boundaries required apportionment, shows the high likelihood that a lay 
jury would be greatly confused by the same questions. 
But even aside from the policy implications of refusing apportionment and the 
confusion created for the jury, it remains true that under section 78B-5-818 Dr. Keiter 
was entitled to ask the jury to apportion fault because he made a timely request and 
because he provided a factual and legal basis to support his request to apportion fault. As 
a matter of law and as a matter of sound public policy, the jury should have been allowed 
to apportion fault to the implant manufacturer. 
C. Not allowing the jury to apportion fault was incorrect as a matter of law 
and warrants reversal and remand 
The jury heard ample evidence that the implant was defective and ruptured, and 
that the silicone in Ms. Call's body could never be fully removed. Without the presence 
of silicone from the ruptured implant, Ms. Call would never have developed the silicone 
granulomas and need for surgery that were the subject of this suit. In other words, the 
fact that the implant was defective and leaked silicone into Ms. Call's body was a 
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triggering, causal event in the chain of events that led to Ms. Call's surgical and medical 
treatment by Dr. Keiter. 
Although the jury could have apportioned fault among the implant manufacturer, 
Dr. Keiter, and Ms. Call, it was allowed only two choices for apportionment. As a result, 
it is highly likely that the jury attributed to Dr. Keiter any fault that it would otherwise 
have attributed to the manufacturer. 
This result violates the plain language of section 78B-8-818(4), the policy 
considerations underlying Utah's comparative fault scheme, and notions of fundamental 
fairness. An error is harmful if "'absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a 
more favorable outcome for the appellant[.]'" Hill v. Alfred, 2009 UT 28, TJ30, P.3d 
(May 1, 2009) (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1209 n.3 (Utah 1993)). 
Given the undisputed evidence that silicone from the ruptured implant caused Ms. 
Call's granulomas, and that it was this silicone that necessitated Ms. Call's later surgeries 
and medical treatment, it is highly likely that the jury would have apportioned some fault 
to the implant manufacturer. This, in turn, would have reduced any damages award 
against Dr. Keiter. Accordingly, the trial court's error was harmful. If this Court 
declines to reverse the trial court's denial of Dr. Keiter's summary judgment motion, this 
case should be reversed and remanded with instructions to allow the jury to use a special 
verdict to apportion any finding of fault among the implant manufacturer, Dr. Keiter, and 
Ms. Call. 
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III. The trial courts should have granted Dr. Keiter's motion for a directed 
verdict and his post-trial motions 
A. Reasonable Minds Could Not Have Differed On the Evidence 
Presented By Ms. Call, Which Showed That Ms. Call's Claimed 
Damages Were Caused By The Leaked Silicone and Were Thus Barred 
By The Statute of Limitations 
The trial court erred in denying Dr. Keiter's motion for a directed verdict at the 
close of Ms. Call's case-in-chief, in which Dr. Keiter argued that Ms. Call's damages 
related to the silicone and its removal were precluded by evidence presented and the 
statute of limitations. (R. at 1820: 480.) 
Dr. Keiter argued that Ms. Call could not recover any damages related to 
silicone or removal of silicone because Dr. Miner admitted it was impossible to remove 
all of the silicone, the presence of silicone was due to the rupture of the implant, and the 
statute of limitations had run on the rupture of the implant. (R. at 1820:479-81.) Ms. 
Call saw Dr. Keiter in 1995 and indicated her implant had ruptured. During the treatment 
in 1995, Ms. Call was informed that Dr. Keiter was unable to remove all of the silicone 
and she would need future treatment. Ms. Call's expert, Dr. Miner, corroborated that it 
was impossible to remove all of the silicone. In ruling on the summary judgment motion, 
the trial court ruled that Ms. Call could not recover for any treatment provided prior to 
December 18, 2000. Furthermore, Ms. Call received compensation from a class-action 
settlement because the implant was defective and could rupture - as it did. 
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The trial court denied this motion. Specifically, the trial court determined that 
Dr. Miner, although noting it was impossible for any physician to remove all of the 
silicone, criticized Dr. Keiter for not removing more of it. (R. at 1820: 490.) The trial 
court incorrectly noted that Dr. Miner was not critical of the pre-2000 care and used this 
as a basis to deny the motion. (R. at 1820: 490.) In fact, as set forth above, Dr. Miner 
did criticize the early treatment and indicated that it set everything in motion for the later 
granulomas. 
In addition, Dr. Keiter5 s motion noted that plaintiff was seeking to recover 
damages solely related to the removal of silicone granulomas. These damages were both 
before and after the cutoff date. Ms. Call should not have been allowed to recover these 
damages. 
Furthermore, as discussed in point II of this brief regarding apportionment of 
fault, the trial court incorrectly believed this issue was one for the jury to decide. The 
trial court stated: "I think [plaintiff gets] to go to the jury and argue the weight of how 
much of that is attributed to Dr. Keiter and how much of that is going to just naturally 
come because unfortunately the silicone burst but that's an issue that the jury has to 
resolve." (R. at 1820: 490.) The jury, however, could not apportion fault to the implant 
manufacturer. Because this claim was barred by the statute of limitations and the 
evidence at trial did not support the claim, reasonable minds could not differ on the 
evidence presented and the trial court erred in denying the motion for a directed verdict. 
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See Management of Gray stone Pine Homeowner's Ass yn ex rel Owners of 
Condominiums v. Gray stone Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 896 (Utah 1982). 
B. Because Ms. Call Failed to Show That Her Injuries Were Caused By 
Dr. Keiter's Treatment, the Trial Court Should Have Granted Dr. 
Keiter's Post-Trial Motions 
Dr. Keiter renewed his motion for a directed verdict and his summary judgment 
arguments in his post-trial motion, and the trial court erred in denying this motion. In his 
post-trial motion, Dr. Keiter requested a judgment notwithstanding the verdict because 
Ms. Call failed to demonstrate that her injuries were caused by Dr. Keiter's treatment. 
Specifically, Dr. Keiter argued the evidence at trial showed that Ms. Call's injuries could 
just as easily have resulted from the leaked silicone or the earlier surgeries for which Ms. 
Call could not recover as from the treatment rendered on or after December 18, 2000. (R. 
at 1293, 1297-98.) 
Dr. Keiter also argued in the alternative for a new trial under Rule 59 because of 
the improper introduction of evidence at trial related to silicone and silicone retention-
related injuries, and because he was not able to apportion fault to the implant 
manufacturer after this evidence was admitted. (R. at 1298-1300.) Specifically, at trial, 
the jury repeatedly heard evidence related to injuries caused by the residual silicone in 
Ms. Call's breast. As discussed earlier in this brief, Ms. Call's theory of the case was that 
she was injured by an infection that arose from the residual silicone left in her breast after 
the 1995 rupture and Dr. Keiter repeatedly failed to treat this infection. Further, Ms. Call 
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requested damages for the costs of surgeries after 2000 that related solely to the removal 
of silicone granulomas. 
At trial, the jury heard about the retained silicone after the 1995 rupture, the 
resulting infection, and the multiple visits to Dr. Keiter both before and after the cut-off 
date. The jury heard Dr. Miner's nidus of infection theory and his criticisms of both Dr. 
Keiter's pre- and post-cut-off date treatment of Ms. Call. The jury, however, was not 
given any opportunity to apportion fault to the implant manufacturer after hearing this 
evidence. 
These rulings were erroneous because the claims based on residual silicone and 
related injuries were barred by the statute of limitations. (R. at 1299.) After the evidence 
came in at trial, Dr. Keiter should have been allowed to list the implant manufacturer on 
the special verdict form in order to limit the prejudicial effect of that evidence. 
The trial court has broad discretion in ruling for new trial; in this case, the trial 
court's denial was an abuse of discretion. See Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789 
(Utah 1991). The trial court partially denied Dr. Keiter's motion for summary judgment 
and set a cut-off date for the claims that Ms. Call could pursue at trial. The trial court 
precluded Dr. Keiter from listing the implant manufacturer on the special verdict because 
it concluded that Ms. Call could not pursue any claims before the cut-off date and thus, 
Dr. Keiter had no need to apportion fault to a non-party whose acts occurred prior to the 
cut-off date. After the trial court heard the evidence introduced at trial regarding silicone 
retention and the source of the infection; however, it should have realized the need to 
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allow Dr. Keiter to apportion fault to the manufacturer. Dr. Keiter renewed his request 
during the arguments relating to jury instructions and the special verdict. The trial court 
compounded these errors when it denied Dr. Keiter's post-trial motion. This Court 
should reverse the trial court's denial of Dr. Keiter's post-trial motions. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment to 
Dr. Keiter. Because there were no disputed issues of material fact and Dr. Keiter was 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law, this Court owes no deference to the trial court's 
ruling and may conclude as a matter of law that summary judgment in full was proper. 
In the alternative, this Court should reverse and remand for a new trial to allow 
Dr. Keiter to apportion fault to the implant manufacturer. As a final option in the 
alternative, this Court should reverse the trial court's denial of Dr. Keiter's post-trial 
motions and direct that judgment be entered in Dr. Keiter's favor. 
•21 DATED this y\# day of June, 2009. 
RICHARDS BRANDT MILLER NELSON 
CHRTSTmN W. NELSON 
fAWNU ANDERSON 
LY E. PETERSON 
D. ARMSTRONG 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment 
may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of a motion for 
summary judgment by the adverse party, move for summary judgment upon all or any part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is 
sought, may, at any time, move for summary judgment as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be in accordance with Rule 7. The 
judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together 
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability 
alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for 
all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the 
evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial 
controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying 
the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other relief is 
not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so 
specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal 
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is 
competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an 
affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported 
as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the pleadings, but the 
response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine 
issue for trial. Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against a party failing to file such a response. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the party cannot 
for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse the application 
for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be 
had or may make such other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. If any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are presented in bad faith or solely 
for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order the party presenting them to pay to the other party the amount of 
the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending 
party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
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SHARLENE CALL, 
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JOHN E. KEITER, M.D., 
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ORDER 
Case No. 030903501 
Judge Brent W. West 
On October 27, 2006, the following motions came before the Court: Defendant 
John E. Keiter, M.D.'s Motion In Limine Regarding Evidence of Liability Insurance; Defendant 
John E. Keiter, M.D.'s Motion In Limine Regarding Application of the Collateral Source Rule; 
Defendant's Motion In Limine Re: Noneconomic Damages Cap; Plaintiffs Motion for In Camera 
Inspection of the Notice of Intent; Defendant's Motion In Limine to Strike Plaintiffs Expert 
Witness Robert T. Miner, M.D. and to Exclude Evidence; Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment; Defendant's Request for Judicial Notice; and Plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions. 
The Court, having reviewed the relevant pleadings and documents, and otherwise 
being fully advised, now makes and enters the following FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW, AND ORDERS: 
DEFENDANT JOHN E. KEITER MJVS MOTION IN LIMINE REGARDING 
EVIDENCE OF LIABILITY INSURANCE 
The Court HEREBY GRANTS Defendant's Motion In Limine Regarding 
Evidence of Liability Insurance. The motion and supporting memorandum were filed on or about 
October 9, 2006. Plaintiff presented no written opposition. The motion was introduced by 
counsel for Defendant during the October 27, 2006 hearing. Counsel for Plaintiff confirmed in 
open court that Plaintiff does not oppose the motion. 
DEFENDANT JOHN E. KEITER, MJVS MOTION IN LIMINE REGARDING 
APPLICATION OF THE COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE 
The Court HEREBY GRANTS Defendant's Motion In Limine Regarding 
Application of the Collateral Source Rule. The motion and supporting memorandum were filed 
on or about October 9, 2006. Plaintiff presented no written opposition. The motion was 
introduced by counsel for Defendant during the October 27, 2006 hearing. Counsel for Plaintiff 
confirmed in open court that Plaintiff does not oppose the motion. 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN LIMINE RE: NONECONOMIC DAMAGES CAP 
The Court HEREBY GRANTS Defendant's Motion In Limine Re: Noneconomic 
Damages Cap. The motion and supporting memorandum were filed on or about October 9, 2006. 
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Plaintiff presented no written opposition. The motion was introduced by counsel for Defendant 
during the October 27, 2006 hearing. Counsel for Plaintiff confirmed in open court that Plaintiff 
does not oppose the motion. 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR IN CAMERA INSPECTION OF THE NOTICE OF 
INTENT 
The motion and supporting memorandum were filed by Plaintiff on or 
about October 20, 2006. Defendant presented no written opposition. The motion was introduced 
by counsel during oral argument related to Defendants' Motion In Limine to Strike Plaintiffs 
Expert Witness Robert T. Miner, M.D. and to Exclude Evidence. Counsel for Defendant 
confirmed in open court that Defendant does not oppose in camera inspection of the Notice of 
Intent. The Court GRANTED Plaintiffs motion, whereupon a brief recess was taken and , judge, 
court reporter, bailiff and counsel reconvened in chambers for the Court's in camera inspection of 
the Notice of Intent. 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION IN LIMINE TO STRIKE PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT WITNESS 
ROBERT T. MINER, M.D. AND TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE 
The Court HEREBY GRANTS IN PART, AND DENIES IN PART Defendants' 
Motion In Limine to Strike Plaintiff's Expert Witness Robert T. Miner, M.D. and to Exclude 
Evidence. The motion and supporting memorandum were filed on or about October 9, 2006. A 
written memorandum in opposition was filed by Plaintiff on or about October 20, 2006. By Order 
of the Court, and stipulation of the parties, no Reply Memorandum was submitted relative to this 
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motion, due to the parties' desire for an expedited hearing. Based on the above-described 
pleadings and on argument presented by both parties, the Court, now makes and enters the 
following FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court finds that Plaintiff, through counsel, inappropriately disclosed 
the Notice of Intent to Commence Medical Malpractice Action regarding her claim to her expert 
witness, Dr. Miner. 
2. The Court finds that Dr. Miner relied on the Notice of Intent to Commence 
Medical Malpractice Action in at least the following ways: forming his opinions and in creating his 
report. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court concludes that, under Utah law, a Notice of Intent to 
Commence Medical Malpractice Action (hereinafter "Notice of Intent") is a confidential part of 
the pre-litigation process and that Utah law prohibits the disclosure of the document to an expert 
witness. 
2. The Court also concludes that it has discretion as to the remedy to impose 
as a result of Plaintiffs inappropriate disclosure of the confidential Notice of Intent to Dr. Miner. 
The Court will not require Plaintiff to obtain a new expert witness. However, Defendant is 
entitled to cross examine Dr. Miner with respect to all of his activity and involvement in this 
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matter and the foundation and bases for any and all opinions, testimony and reports, including, 
without limitation all documents and in particular Plaintiffs Notice of Intent. The Court will later 
determine how to allow this cross examination without disclosing to the jury or during trial that 
Dr. Miner obtained this information, at least in part, through the confidential Notice of Intent. 
ORDER 
1. Defendant shall have 3 days in which to request an evidentiary hearing, 
at which Dr. Miner will be required to appear at Plaintiffs expense, for purposes of discovering 
the extent to which Dr. Miner relied upon and/or otherwise utilized Plaintiffs Notice of Intent to 
Commence Malpractice Action. 
2. At the trial of this matter, Defendant shall be permitted to introduce 
Plaintiffs Notice of Intent to Commence Medical Malpractice Action and to cross examine Dr. 
Miner with respect to the same, in open court and before the jury. However, the document will 
be re-titled and will not be referred to as the Notice of Intent to Commence Medical Malpractice 
Action or any similar name. Apart from the title, the document shall be the same document in 
every respect as Plaintiffs Notice of Intent to Commence Medical Malpractice Action, which is 
the subject of this motion. The name by which this document will be identified at trial, will be 
decided by stipulation of the parties, or by Court Order, on or before the first day of trial. 
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DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
The Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment. The motion and supporting memorandum were filed on or about October 
10, 2006. A written memorandum in opposition was filed by Plaintiff on or about October 24, 
2006. By Order of the Court, and stipulation of the parties, no written Reply Memorandum was 
submitted relative to this motion, due to the parties' desire for an expedited hearing. Based on 
the above-described pleadings and on argument presented by both parties, the Court, now makes 
and enters the following FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court finds that Plaintiff seeks to recover damages for allegedly 
negligent medical treatment rendered by Defendant only on and/or after December 18, 2000. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Plaintiffs claims, if any, regarding negligent care and treatment occurring 
before December 18, 2000 are barred by the Utah Malpractice Act statute of limitations. 
2. Plaintiffs claims regarding negligent care and treatment occurring on or 
after December 18, 2000 remain viable at this time. 
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ORDER 
1. Plaintiff is only entitled to recover damages for conduct which occurred 
on or after December 18, 2000. 
2. Considering the potential prejudice related to this issue, the extent to 
which, and the manner in which, Plaintiff will be permitted to present evidence, at the time of trial, 
related to medical care and treatment rendered by Dr. Keiter to Plaintiff prior to December 18, 
2000 will be determined at a future pre-trial conference. 
3. Defendant may renew his Motion for Summary Judgment on statute of 
limitations grounds after the presentation of Plaintiffs case and/or after the presentation of 
Defendant's case. 
DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 
The Court HEREBY GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendant's 
Request for Judicial Notice. The motion and supporting memorandum were filed on or about 
October 9, 2006. A written memorandum in opposition was filed by Plaintiff on or about October 
24, 2006. By Order of the Court, and stipulation of the parties, no written Reply Memorandum 
was submitted relative to this motion, due to the parties' desire for an expedited hearing. Based 
on the above-described pleadings and on argument presented by both parties, the Court, now 
makes and enters the following FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND 
ORDER: 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Filing Record for Dow Corning Corporation, 
a copy of which is attached to Defendant's Request for Judicial Notice, is information sufficient to 
allow the Court to take judicial notice of the fact that Dow Corning Corporation filed for Chapter 
11 bankruptcy on or about May 15, 1995. 
2. The December 2, 1999, United States Bankruptcy Court Amended 
Opinion on the Classification and Treatment of Claims, a copy of which is attached to 
Defendant's Request for Judicial Notice, is information sufficient to allow the Court to 
take judicial notice of the fact that, as part of the Dow Corning Corporation bankruptcy, a trust 
was created to compensate claimants who received silicone breast implants. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Pursuant to Rule 201 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, "[a] court shall take 
judicial notice if requested by a party and supplied with the necessary information." 
ORDER 
1. Judicial notice is hereby taken of the fact that Dow Corning Corporation 
filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy on or about May 15, 1995. 
2. Judicial notice is hereby taken of the fact that, as part of the Dow Corning 
Corporation bankruptcy, a trust was created to compensate claimants who received silicone breast 
implants. 
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3. Ji idicial n< - - ed in Defendant's Request for Judicial 
Notice is not taken at this time. 
p L M N T I F F S M O T I Q N F Q R SANCTIONS 
The Court HEREBY DENIES Hamuli' , Muhnn In. Saitctioi is. I he motion and 
supporting memorandum were filed by Plaintiff on or about October 18, 2006. The October 27, 
2006 hearing on •(•• p | |HI< >• " ""« "i<fi< in '.viucfi a responsive pleading was to be filed Asa 
result, no further briefing was submitted. Plaintiffs motion was mlmdm nl hy I Icfhulanl ..Iriiiiir1; 
- . n from the bench. 
Dated this 22 ~ day of 0%fchM&l
 y ^ W u. 
BY THE COURT: 
HONORABLE BRENT W WEST 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
D. David Lambert 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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1 Lhe general damage claims, the disfigurement and can't reach 
2 and those types of claims, but the depression she said she 
3 cannot link and no one has linked medically and again it's a 
4 medical malpractice case, it's not just a run of the mill 
5 personal injury case but no medical expert has linked the 
6 depression to anything in this particular case or anything 
7 that Dr. Keiter did. No one has linked the inability to lift 
8 to anything Dr. Keiter did within the statutory period and 
9 again remember, we've got these prior surgeries. We've got 
10 these prior surgeries, we've got the (inaudible) surgery, 
11 we've got the surgery to place the silicone implants, all 
12 that created scar tissue. No one has said, well, I can 
13 separate medically out the scar tissue that was created from 
14 those surgeries to the later surgeries which are within the 
15 statutory period and I can tie her inability to lift or do 
16 some of these things, the depression specifically, only to 
17 that period and that has to be done medically, it's the 
18 plaintiff's burden to do that. And same with the fever, 
19 chills and night sweats. 
20 Thank you, Your Honor. 
21 THE COURT: The Court is prepared to rule. I'll 
22 take them in the order that Mr. Nelson raised the issues. 
23 I'm denying - and some of these are quite frankly close 
24 calls. I'm denying the Motion for Directed Verdict on the 
25 silicone removal. Viewing the case in the plaintiff's best 
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1 light, their claim against Dr. Keiter is that there was a 
2 pattern of treatment that they feel that he was deficient in 
3 doing. I do believe Dr. Miner testified that there were 
4 opportunities where Dr. Keiter could have mitigated or had an 
5 opportunity to relieve the silicone. Yes, he testified that 
6 once the silicone implant burst, they were always going to be 
7 dealing with the issue of silicone but he went on to testify 
8 that he felt that had Ms. Call received the appropriate 
9 treatment, the appropriate cleaning, the fact that he was put 
10 on notice that there were these white things that appeared to 
11 be silicone, that he had opportunities during his pattern of 
12 treatment to mitigate or attack that, I think they get to go 
13 to the jury and argue the weight of how much of that is 
14 attributed to Dr. Keiter and how much of that is going to 
15 just naturally come because unfortunately the silicone burst 
16 but that's an issue that the jury has to resolve. 
17 In regards to the total capsulectomy, I would deny 
18 the Motion for Directed Verdict there. I do think Dr. Miner 
19 made it perfectly clear the patient has options available to 
20 her and I don't think we can ignore the fact that she has to 
21 decide at some point whether she wants to go through life 
22 unbalanced or without the symmetry and the possibilities are 
23 replacing the left one and bringing that out, if you can, or 
24 perhaps she could choose to have the right one taken out even 
25 though there isn't anything wrong with it or anything that's 
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1 indicated that there's anything wrong in it in order to be 
2 balanced and to have symmetry and to avoid future problems 
3 like this. She's testified at great lengths about how she's 
4 afraid of having the operation and so she's been reluctant to 
5 make that decision but I think again, viewing the evidence in 
6 the best light of the plaintiffs is their argument is through 
7 Dr. Keiter's pattern of treatment. She's in a position now 
8 where she's got a left breast and a right breast, they're not 
9 the same, they're asymmetrical, she's put in that situation 
10 and she eventually will have to make a decision as to which 
11 way to go. 
12 I could not tell from Dr. Miner's testimony whether 
13 he was saying as a doctor he wouldn't go that way or whether 
14 he was saying he wouldn't do that or he wouldn't recommend 
15 that but he didn't say it wasn't impossible - excuse me, he 
16 didn't say it wasn't possible, he didn't say it wasn't 
17 something that should be considered. I suspect from what he 
18 said that if she said I want to do it, he might try to talk 
19 her out of it but he's also not going to be her future 
20 physician in that particular situation so I would allow that 
21 issue to go, I think it goes to weight. 
22 In regards to the general damages I do agree with 
23 your argument on depression. There's been no link that has 
24 been made. I understand she had a predisposition to 
25 depression. I understand that this was a traumatic event but 
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1 even Dr. Miner, I don't think was able to say that this would 
2 cause or trigger in regards to the depression. 
3 In regards to the can't lift, I think that does go 
4 to the jury. The scarring is a cumulative thing. She's had 
5 repeated surgeries, she's had repeated openings, she's had 
6 repeated wounds and it's tough to say, well, the original 
7 surgery caused the scarring or the second one or the third 
8 one or the fourth procedure or whatever. So the bottom line 
9 is the cumulative effect is the treatment of her breast, the 
10 surgery and everything else has caused the scar tissue which 
11 has placed restrictions on her abilities to do things and her 
12 inability to lift her arm, pick up her grandchildren and 
13 again, I think the jury gets to make that particular 
14 situation. 
15 I also do think they get to go on the fevers, the 
16 chills and the night sweats. Yes, it can be argued by both 
17 sides that it may very well be the reflection of her age and 
18 menopause and those kinds of things but on the other hand, 
19 people who suffer from severe infections get fever, chills, 
20 night sweats. Those of you that have had sinus infections or 
21 had colds or had fevers, when the infection goes away if 
22 you've ever had a toothache, when the infection goes away, 
23 guess what, the fever goes away, the chills go away, the 
24 night sweats go away. I think Dr. Miner was candid in saying 
25 it could very well be attributable to menopause. She however 
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has testified several times that she's been at least twice 
while this lawsuit has been pending, indicating that she's 
not in menopause now and so it's a fair assumption to go to 
the jury that the fever, chills and night sweats, because 
they occurred at time when she may have been in menopause or 
when she had this substantial infection are attributable to 
that because her testimony is, once the infection was taken 
out, she's not as subject to those and is not in menopause. 
So again, I think it goes to the weight and she gets to argue 
that. 
I do agree the evidence is in my opinion weak in 
regards to the fact that it triggered her depression. I 
think as a layman I could say, well, if you're prone to 
depression and you go through a traumatic thing, it may have 
triggered it again but I don't even think Dr. Miner's 
test 
far 
imony went to that extent. 
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1 notice that if she sought recovery for harm caused by 
2 silicone, it was our position that that harm is attributable 
3 to the manufacturer. 
4 Now as I understand it, they're limited to Dr. 
5 Keiter's care on December 18 forward. Now they wanted to, 
6 you know, leave the impression that he left silicone behind, 
7 that he should have removed the entire capsule but didn't, if 
8 he had he might have gotten more of the silicone; when he did 
9 the surgery he found strands of silicones. Mrs. Call has 
10 testified that she continues to have problems with silicone, 
11 that she continues to have silicone lumps removed, that 
12 that's the reason she saw Dr. Carabine, that's the reason she 
13 saw Dr. Brzowski. Those charges are on the special damages 
14 form. They are attempting to seek from Dr. Keiter recovery 
15 for injuries caused by silicone. No matter whose at fault, 
16 they're not permitted to do that against Dr. Keiter. 
17 THE COURT: But the difficulty is the statute 
18 requires the jury to go through the process of comparing 
19 negligence and making a determination and apportioning that 
20 negligence in some way. I understand what you're telling me 
21 and the fact that you put them on notice may be sufficient in 
22 the sense that you preserve that right but the statute 
23 requires them to make an active, conscious process of 
24 comparing the negligence. And on the one hand you've said 
25 don't let them know anything about any alleged negligence 
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1 that Dr. Keiter did and that makes the process of comparison 
2 difficult, if not impossible, and that's where I struggle. 
3 You are correct in your reading of the statute, it requires a 
4 comparison of negligence but you've said, we don't get to 
5 talk about Dr. Keiter or anything that he may have done 
6 during that period so they had nothing to compare and that's 
7 where I think your analogy breaks down from my ruling is 
8 because they have nothing to compare and that's where I think 
9 it's unfair in trying to assess that because the statute does 
10 require them to compare the negligence and you've said don't 
11 let us testify as to any negligence that they have. I may 
12 very well agree with you on the issue of when we get to the 
13 point where if they make a finding that they have to 
14 determine damages, if they insist upon asking for damages in 
15 regards to the additional granulomas, then it may very well 
16 be inappropriate if they're going to consider damages in that 
17 area, they then can look and say how much of that damage is 
18 attributable to Dr. Keiter and how much of that damage would 
19 be attributable to the manufacturer? The more I've thought 
20 about that the more I agree on that is because one thing 
21 that's clear in this case, everybody knew once they got 
22 better information about the silicone that it would remain in 
23 your system and that there would be future surgeries and so I 
24 may agree with you on that point. My problem is I'm not 
25 prepared to give you cart blanche, compare negligence when 
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1 we're not allowed to have examined any negligence that Dr. 
2 Keiter may have done. 
3 MR. LAMBERT: The only thing I would say is that 
4 whenever this issue came up in trial, we had a dialogue the 
5 Court imposed this order and at one time you asked me to 
6 articulate something and I didn't feel comfortable about 
7 getting into it in front of the jury and so we had a bench 
8 conference but we did, we complied with this order. 
9 THE COURT: I agree and I understand - I wanted to 
10 make some more comments because I want to make my record as 
11 well. The fact that people may very well disagree, in my 
12 opinion is just saying there are disagreement factually as to 
13 what occurred or what the pattern of care was or whatever but 
14 the gravamen of my order was is that no one would be able to 
15 argue or make the comment that this constituted negligence 
16 for which Dr. Keiter would be liable for and they couldn't 
17 get up and argue that but the fact that Dr. Keiter says that 
18 he told her that they had an expectancy and she says they 
19 were going to last forever and she thought she was not going 
20 to have saline, neither one of you get to argue that, neither 
21 one of you get to argue that that's damages, neither one of 
22 you get to argue that that's negligence, neither one of you 
23 get to argue that there should be a monetary award for that 
24 but the fact that they disagree upon the history in my 
25 opinion, doesn't necessarily mean that they commented 
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1 negatively or they violated my order. They didn't structure 
2 their case around that but obviously Dr. Keiter and Ms. Call 
3 have legitimate disagreements about what was said in the 
4 office on the visits and the fact that they may disagree 
5 doesn't necessarily mean that they can draw an inference from 
6 that. This case is still about the alleged care that Dr. 
7 Keiter gave her from that December operation onward and it 
8 lives and falls with a finding of negligence, a finding of 
9 cause and a finding of damages in that particular thing and I 
10 am struggling with how to balance the settlement in regards 
11 to the material because everybody seems to be clear that once 
12 it was discovered, that material stays there and there will 
13 be reasons to go back. 
14 MR. NELSON: I agree with you, Your Honor, it's 
15 only an issue when the damages are sought for the silicone 
16 and that's what brought this up because then what do we do 
17 with that? Anyway — 
18 THE COURT: Well, I think we can craft an 
19 instruction that says, you know, special verdict form that 
20 says do you find this, do you find this, do you find this on 
21 the issue of damages. If you decide to award damages for 
22 future situations then you must compare how much of that is 
23 Dr. Keiter and how much of that is related to Dr. Keiter's 
24 treatment if so, and how much is located to the product — 
25 MR. NELSON: That sounds appropriate. 
837 
INSTRUCTION NO. * l 
Plaintiff claims that the care she received from Dr. Keiter on and after 
December 18,2000 was negligent. Any information or evidence presented regarding care 
Plaintiff received from Dr. Keiter prior to December 18,2000 has been presented for 
background information only. You are not to consider this information as part of 
Plaintiffs claims in this case. 
INSTRUCTION NO. _ ? ? 
In determining whether or not defendant was negligent in this case, you are not to 
consider any claims or allegations related to damage or injuries caused by silicone, including any 
claims regarding retained silicone, removed silicone or future care related to silicone, prior to 
December 18,2000. 
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denied. An affidavit of an attorney is not necessary because Ms. Armstrong is an officer of the 
Court. In addition, a transcript would have been preferable, but again, the Court has sufficient 
understanding of this case to rule on these motions. 
Fourth, the Court does not need an additional hearing or oral argument to resolve these 
motions. They are well briefed and actually deal with issues that have been previously raised and 
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Finally, the Defendant's Motions for a Judgment Not Withstanding the Verdict and a 
New Trial are denied. In addressing these motions, the Court will attempt to address all the sub-
issues that have been raised by both parties. 
The Court, even upon a second reflection, finds that the Plaintiff has met her burden of 
presenting a prima facie case of medical negligence. In its simplest form, the issue has always 
been whether or not the medical treatment that the Plaintiff received from the Defendant, since 
December 18, 2000, in regards to her breast enhancement surgery was negligent. That issue was 
disputed, the evidence went to a jury and the jury found for the Plaintiff. 
The Defendant now attempts to break out various aspects of the Plaintiffs overall verdict 
and attack them individually. This would include the treatment of the Plaintiffs right breast, the 
total capsulectomy of the Plaintiffs left breast, additional disfigurement and avoidable scarring 
and any overlap of any negligent medical treatment by the Defendant, before or after December 
18, 2000. The difficulty is that all these issues were submitted to the jury. The jury sorted them 
out and reached a general verdict. The jury was not asked to address these issues separately. This 
Court has no way of determining whether any or all of the damages were apportioned among 
these specific claims by the jury. The jury may have accepted or rejected all or a portion of each 
claim for damage. 
On the other hand, the Court did address these issues separately and did make individual 
rulings on the admissibility of each of these sub-issues. Nothing has been presented, by either 
party, that would lead this Court to find that it ruled incorrectly in its determination of initial 
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admissibility. As previously indicated, the Court found that these issues, with some restrictions in 
some areas, were admissible and that the real issue was the weight to be given them by the triers 
of fact. 
The Court attempts to try these cases as it finds them. Unfortunately, in this case, there 
was one extremely difficult factual scenario that needed to be addressed. In this instance the 
Plaintiff had received long term medical care and treatment from the Defendant. This resulted in 
a situation where the Defendant's medical care overlapped a period of time that was barred by 
the applicable statute of limitations. The Court addressed this situation the best it could. The 
Court fashioned a ruling and, more importantly, jury instructions that dealt with the situation as it 
existed. The Court did not want to create an artificial situation that would have favored one party 
or the other. The Court is satisfied with its ruling and jury instructions. Admittedly, the Appellate 
Courts may view this issue differently and that is their prerogative. 
The Court found the testimony of Plaintiff s expert, Dr. Miner, to be admissible. The 
Court allowed him to testify to the jury. The Defendant again attacks the qualifications of Dr. 
Miner to testify. Again, the Court finds nothing that causes the Court to find that its initial ruling 
in regards to Dr. Miner was incorrect. Dr. Miner's qualifications were sufficient to allow him to 
testify. The weight that should have been given to his testimony was for the triers of fact to 
determine. 
Lastly, there is nothing in the jury's verdict that would lead the Court to find that the 
jury's verdict was the result of passion or prejudice. In fact, the contrary is true. The jury was 
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extremely deliberate. They paid close attention to the trial, the issues and the arguments. Their 
verdict appears reasonable, rational and well thought out. They appear to have deliberated on all 
the issues and returned a well-supported verdict. There are clearly sufficient facts, in the trial, to 
support the jury's verdict. 
Counsel for the Plaintiff will please prepare an Order, consistent with this Ruling. 
Dated this 27th day of October 2008. 
Judge W. Brent West 
Second District Court 
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